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AbstrAct: This essay pursues two goals: (1) to argue that two fundamental types of  time—the 
time of  objective reality and “the time of  the soul”—meet in human activity and history and 
(2) to defend the legitimacy of  calling a particular version of  the second type a kind of  time. 
The essay begins by criticizing Paul ricoeur’s version of  the claim that times of  these two sorts 
meet in history. it then presents an account of  human activity based on heidegger’s Being and 
Time, according to which certain times of  the two types—existential temporality and succes-
sion—meet in human activity. The legitimacy of  calling existential temporality a kind of  time 
is then defended via an expanded analysis of  activity that examines where the two times meet 
there. The concluding section briefly considers a conception of  historical time due to David 
Carr before showing why history is a broader domain encompassing human activity where the 
two times meet. 
Keywords: Time of  Activity, historical Time, history and Time, Times of  history, existential 
Time and Objective Time
Two categories of  time have exercised twentieth century philosophers. One is the 
time of  objective reality. The other is the time of  human experience or existence, a fea-
ture of experience or existence, not necessarily something experienced or lived through. 
The first category has dominated not just philosophy, but twentieth-century intellectual 
life more broadly—it is the time of  natural science and was also used by and refined 
in the rationalization processes of  Western modernity. The second category was rein-
vigorated above all by the phenomenological movement, which made “the time of  the 
soul” a going concern. The question of  whether these two categories of  time instanti-
ate a single master category or form an unimpeachable duality will be ignored here. 
Assuming that they form a duality, this essay instead pursues two goals: first, to defend 
the thesis that certain times of  the two sorts meet in human activity and history and, 
second, to defend the legitimacy of  calling a particular version of  the time of  the soul 
a type of  time.
section one broadly sets out the distinction between the time of  objective reality 
and the time of  the soul. section two takes initial steps toward the first goal, examining 
Paul ricoeur’s claim (1988) that times of  these two sorts meet in the form of  a third 
time, historical time, that cannot be reduced to either. This thesis contains an important 
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truth, to wit, that times of  the two sorts meet in history. ricoeur, however, wrongly con-
strued the history involved as history writing instead of  the nexus of  past human actions 
and events. Following this discussion, section three sketches an account of  human activ-
ity based on heidegger’s Being and Time, according to which certain times of  the two 
sorts inherently meet in human activity, not because activity institutes a third time, but 
instead because it instantiates each time. section four then takes up the second goal 
enumerated above, that of  defending the legitimacy of  calling the heideggarian time 
of  activity presented in section three a kind of  time. This defense proceeds by way of  
an expanded analysis of  human activity that shows in detail how existential action time 
and objective time meet there. The final section of  the essay returns squarely to the first 
issue, showing why the object domain called history is a broader realm encompassing 
human activity where the two times meet.
Before beginning, i acknowledge that the current essay pays little attention to the 
time of  objective reality. most philosophical discussions of  time concern this category, 
and many divergent or contradictory versions of  it exist. Theorists have disputed, among 
other things, whether objective time is absolute, relational, or relative, a pure advance 
along which events fall, a set of  relations among events, or an ordering relative to some 
frame or perspective. Theorists have also contested whether the entities that occur in 
time, or relations among which constitute time, are objects, events, atomic events, or 
processes. Age-old disputes over being and becoming have re-emerged in analyses of  
the nature of  time, just as issues of  four-dimensional manifolds and of  reversibility 
and irreversibility have been pressed of  late. my essay ignores this diversity of  issues 
and conceptions and treats the time of  objective reality as succession. For practically 
all modern conceptions of  the time of  objective reality make succession, or before and 
after, essential to it. seizing on this common denominator and treating objective time 
as essentially tied to before and after is sufficient for the purpose of  defending the thesis 
that action and history are where certain times of  the two categories meet. Pursuing 
the second goal of  the essay—defending the legitimacy of  calling a certain time of  the 
soul a type of  time—likewise does not require more than cursory attention to objective 
time. Anyone who objects to this equation of  the time of  objective reality with succes-
sion can simply treat the topic of  this essay as the meeting point of  the time of  the soul 
and succession.
i. The TWO CATegOries OF Time
As just indicated, characteristic of  the time of  objective reality is succession. 
Objective time essentially involves before and after whether it is thought to be abso-
lute, relational, relative, reversible, irreversible, or part of  a four-dimensional manifold. 
Wherever entities occur before and after one another, or either a pure before and after 
or a before and after ordering exists, there is succession—and time. it does not matter 
what sorts of  entity are involved. in particular, experiences, actions, physical events, and 
temporal positions alike can be before and after. indeed, both the natural sciences and 
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the human sciences think of  their subject matters as exhibiting successions. succession, 
consequently, is not inherently a dimension of  physical, or material, reality. it is, instead, 
the time of  objective reality, the universe: anything that happens assumes a position in 
the successions that mark this reality.
Characteristic of  experiential or existential time is past, present, and future. 
Wherever entities are structured by or distributed among these, there is dimensional-
ity1—and time. Again, it does not matter what sorts of  entity are involved. For example, 
physical events can be distributed among these three dimensions as much as experi-
ences, actions, or temporal positions can be. Whereas these three dimensions, however, 
are not essential to how the natural sciences conceptualize their subject matter, they are 
essential to how history does this; they also regularly figure in descriptions of  human 
life in the human sciences. What is more, dimensionality does not characterize objec-
tive reality. For what is present objective reality, relative to which that reality has a past 
and future? The state of  reality simultaneous with the present of  we contemplating the 
question? This present, however, is relative to us. And this relativity indicates that, even 
though we are part of  objective reality, any ordering of  entities as past, present, and 
future is relative to people. The fact that the pasts examined in evolutionary theory and 
natural history, like those studied in history, are simply whatever precedes the investi-
gator’s era, illustrates this relativity. it follows that orderings of  entities as past, present, 
and future are as multiple as relevant human presents are numerous. This particular 
relativity and multiplicity contrast with the independence and unity, as well as with 
the inertial frame relativity, ascribed to succession. Whereas, therefore, succession is 
associated with objective reality, past, present, and future have come to be construed as 
dependent on, even as dimensions of, human experience or existence. This dependence 
reflects the very real sense that humans possess (and have possessed for at least the past 
few millennia) that some things have gone by, other things are happening, and more 
things are to come. Notice that i am not denying that human life occurs in objective 
reality as part of  the successions that fill in the time of  that reality. i am both pointing 
out that past, present, and future—at least in modern thought—are tied to, or a feature 
of, human experience or existence and asserting that this connection is a characteristic 
of  the category of  experiential and existential times. 
This division between a time of  succession marking objective reality and a time of  
dimensionality seated in human life emerged in early Christian philosophy. Objective 
passage is the greek notion of  time, the considerable variations among greek thinkers 
notwithstanding (for elaboration of  the history in the present paragraph, see sherover 
2003). Deviating from the greek inheritance, Plotinus (1969) suggested that time is 
“contained in the differentiation of  life.” For Plotinus, time is the life of  the soul as 
it moves from one act or experience to another. This idea makes time a denizen of  
human existence, but retains succession as its essential feature. The succession that is 
1. in calling past, present, and future “dimensions” of  time i mean simply that they are the structural com-
ponents of  time. Dimension has nothing (at least immediately) to do with axis, as in “three-dimensional” 
space. i cannot think of  an acceptable alternative that avoids this possible misunderstanding.
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time is simply an experiential succession, not one independent of  experience in reality. 
Augustine (1961) appropriated Plotinus’s internalization of  time, but conceived of  the 
time involved as dimensionality. The time of  the soul is a nexus of  past, present, and 
future, or more exactly, a nexus of  present past, present present, and present future. 
Augustine thereby inaugurated a line of  Western philosophy that has associated the 
dimensionality of  time with something human—soul, life, experience, existence.
The dominance in the 20th-century of  the association of  time with objective reality 
is dramatic. Consider, for example, J. e. mcTaggart’s (1908) celebrated differentiation 
between the A and B time series. The A and B series are two systems—past-present-
future and before-after, respectively—for ordering temporal positions or events. “each 
position [or event-Trs] is earlier than some, and Later than some, of  the other posi-
tions. And each position is either Past, Present or Future.” (mcTaggart 1908, 458) 
mcTaggart argued that both series are essential to time: time is one thing of  which 
before and after and past, present, and future are characteristics. he also argued, how-
ever, both that the A series is more fundamental than the B series is to time2 and that 
the application of  the A series to reality involves a contradiction. hence, he concluded, 
the A series does not exist, and time is unreal (ibid., 464, 467). “Does not exist” means 
not true of  reality (ibid., 464). mcTaggart upheld the association of  past-present-future 
with the time of  the soul in suggesting that A series distinctions arise from experience 
(ibid., 471). he rejected, however, the possibility that the A series might be relative to 
individual streams of  experience because this vitiates the status of  time as “belonging to 
reality,” as “ultimate fact.” (ibid., 472) hence, the presumption that time is a feature of  
objective reality (or nothing at all) is essential to this famous argument for the unreality 
of  time.
Also illustrating the dominance of  the association of  time with objective passage 
are the various distinctions between types of  time found in social theory: they are 
almost uniformly distinctions among spans, rhythms, and organizations of  succession. 
A good example is Braudel’s (1980) famous differentiation of  the longue durée from 
both the medium term and the event. According to Braudel, categorically different 
sorts of  social phenomena, and categorically different kinds of  social explanation, are 
associated with these three “levels” of  time. Temporally, however, the differentiation is 
simply one between three expanses of  time: long, medium, and pointillist. Braudel’s 
idea is that different types of  social phenomena exist, persist, and change over different 
expanses of  succession time and that explaining these phenomena requires attention to 
the expanses involved. This is a fecund idea, but it equates time with objective succes-
sion.3 The presumption that time is (or lies in nothing but) objective succession ignores 
both the Augustinian tradition and the evidentness with which for millennia humans 
have experienced and understood their worlds as past, present, and future.
2. mcTaggart also claimed that a nontemporal C series—an order of  events—is as fundamental to time as 
the A series is, but this detail is irrelevant in the present context.
3. Note that i am not saying that Braudel argued that there are three kinds of  objective time. i am simply 
pointing out that each of  these three famous levels of  time is a type of  objective time.
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ii. hisTOriCAL Time As A ThirD Time
The current section takes up ricoeur’s argument that objective succession and the 
dimensionality of  life meet in the form of  a third time, historical time. i consider this 
argument because i concur that times of  the two categories meet in history but disa-
gree with ricoeur about how to fill out this claim. i stress that section two addresses 
arguments found in a single chapter of  a single book and does not essay to place these 
argument in the wider contexts of  either the book or ricoeur’s philosophy. i am inter-
ested solely in his account of  where lived time and objective time meet; focusing on this 
chapter suffices for this purpose. in section five, i examine a different conception of  
historical time that can be speculatively associated with ricoeur.
ricoeur’s expression “third time” is misleading. it suggests that, in addition to objec-
tive and existential/experiential time, there is a further sort, one pertaining to history. 
ricoeur does think that the time of  history differs from succession and dimensionality 
simpliciter. But it does so by being a mix of  them that cannot be reduced to either. it 
is neither “a fragment of  stellar time nor a simple aggrandizement of  the communal 
dimensions of  the time of  personal memory…” (ricoeur 1988, 122) rather, it is an 
interpenetration and “contamination” of  the one and the other.
ricoeur conceptualized the time of  the soul as lived time. Appropriating husserl’s 
(1964) analysis of  internal time consciousness, according to which any present experi-
ence retains what was just experienced and intends what is about to be experienced, 
ricoeur treated dimensionality as an omnipresent feature of  “the lived experience of  
acting and suffering individuals.” Below, by contrast, i will conceptualize the time of  
the soul as a time of  action. This conceptualization is due to heidegger (1962), who 
construed human life as existence and not as a stream of  experience as in husserl. 
since, for heidegger, existence is being-in-the-world and being-in-the-world is acting in 
practical situations, past, present, and future qua feature of  existence are the temporal 
dimensions of  human activity. ricoeur, too, often drew on heidegger and sometime 
described dimensionality existentially (e.g., “mortal time”), but he did not connect this 
time to action.
ricoeur argued that history—the writing of  narratives—institutes historical time, a 
third time, through three “reflective instruments:” calendars, the succession of  genera-
tions, and traces. All three institute this third time by inscribing lived time on “cosmic 
time” (succession).
Calendars have three key features (ricoeur 1988, 106-7): a founding event (e.g., 
the birth of  Christ) that serves as the zero point for computing time; an axis defined by 
this zero point that makes it “possible to traverse time in two directions: from the past 
toward the present, and from the present toward the past;” and units of  measurement 
based on recurring celestial phenomena. This measured, axied, and null-pointed time 
instituted by calendars can be called chronicle time. Chronicle time obviously depends 
on succession. The determination of  the zero point also obviously depends on human 
life (even when the zero point is a physical event). ricoeur claimed, however, that the 
idea of  a zero point is based on the lived time notion of  the present. “if  we did not have 
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the phenomenological notion of  the present…we would not be able to make any sense 
of  the idea of  a new event that breaks with a previous era, inaugurating a course of  
events wholly different from what preceded it.” (ibid., 107) i do not follow this argument. 
A structural parallel certainly holds between the position of  the present between past 
and future and the position of  the zero point between the times leading to and the times 
leading away from it. But choosing a zero point requires only that an event be so impor-
tant that people treat it as a singularity that breaks up the succession of  events into three 
stages: events before the event, the event, and events after it. indeed, the omnipresence 
of  the phenomenological present contravenes the singularity of  the zero point. Nor do i 
accept ricoeur’s further claim that being able to traverse time in two directions is based 
on the fact that human experience retains the past and intends the future. The ability 
to traverse time bidirectionally is already implicit in the designation of  an event that is 
not a present event as the zero point. What’s more, this ability is an abstract ability that 
is unrelated to the retention and protention dimensions of  experience.
Calendars do not inscribe lived time on cosmic time but instead use an event of  
great significance to life to calibrate a succession time-measuring system that is based on 
the recurring movements of  the sun, earth, and moon. Using a event in this way does, 
as ricoeur wrote, bestow new significances on events that succeed one another, as well 
as on those through which people live, viz, positions in the new measuring system (and 
imports relative to the founding event). This would be true, however, even if  experi-
ence did not have the temporal dimensions husserl spied. New significances, even new 
temporal ones, need not be based on the dimensionality of  the time of  the soul. All in 
all, chronicle time is a succession time to whose measurement an event of  crucial signifi-
cance to human life is essential. it is not some “third time” reworking the other two.
The second instrument that ricoeur claimed institutes a third time is the succession 
of  generations. A generation is a biological phenomenon based on the facts of  birth, 
aging, and death. ricoeur averred (ibid., 109), accordingly, that generational succession 
provides a biological basis to historical third time that “succeeds” the celestial basis 
that calendars provide. A generation is also a social entity. For it embraces shared ori-
entations, attitudes, and identities that are grounded in experiences of  the same events 
and in exposure to the same predicaments and “influences.” ricoeur claimed that, in 
the pageant of  history, biosocial generations form what Alfred schutz called (1967) 
the realm of  predecessors, contemporaries, and descendents. Noting that predecessors, 
contemporaries, and descendents are largely anonymous, ricoeur also connected the 
phenomenon of  generations to time by proposing (ricoeur 1988, 112) that the realm 
of  predecessors, contemporaries, and descendents exhibits an “anonymous time”—a 
time that embraces an anonymous past, present, and future—“that is constituted at the 
turning point of  phenomenological and cosmic time.” (ibid.)
ricoeur defended this proposal mostly by discussing how schutz generates the idea 
of  anonymous contemporaries from an individual’s lived-through intersubjective rela-
tions with others who are bodily present. The key step in this generation is a jump 
from the shared enduring unfolding of  experiences of  people who are interacting in 
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person to the not shared but simultaneous unfolding of  experiences of  those thereby 
designated contemporaries. This jump leaps from the intersubjectivity of  other streams 
sharing a present with my own to the anonymity of  other streams that are simultane-
ous with mine. it is not obvious, however, that this jump depends on the dimensionality 
of  experience. For it can be effected even if  experiential streams are conceptualized as 
dimensionless successions (of  experiences). Like chronological time, furthermore, this 
anonymous present (and anonymous time more generally) does not retain anything of  
lived time, i.e., of  retentional-protentional structure. Finally, ricoeur conceded that just 
as the shared enduring unfolding of  experiences is a process over time, simultaneity is 
an at-the-same-timeness that is extended over time. it follows that the anonymous time 
exhibited by the realm of  predecessors, contemporaries, and descendents is a kind of  
succession. it does not combine lived time and succession (though it does, as ricoeur 
also wrote [ibid., 113], mediate between individual lives and the collective character of  
history). 
ricoeur’s discussion of  generations concludes (ibid., 115) with the suggestion that 
the notion of  a succession of  generations, in standing stead for the replacement of  the 
dead by the living, is the anonymous way historians deal with death as the end of  each 
individual life. The notion, he claimed, thereby mediates between the mortal time of  
the individual and public time. in ricoeur’s book, mortal time is a form of  heidegger’s 
existential temporality (as opposed to husserl’s lived time). its appearance in the present 
context, however, does not further ricoeur’s analysis of  historical time as a third time 
that mixes the times of  the soul and objective reality. People are, of  course, mortal, and 
anyone’s ultimate future is, indeed, death. “mortal,” however, can be interpreted in 
two ways. Death can, first, be naturalistically construed as the end of  a life. The “mor-
tal time” death so understood helps define is a figure of  succession, not an existential 
phenomenon. it does not mix existentiality with succession and so cannot support the 
idea that the succession of  generations institutes a third time. Alternatively, death can 
be treated existentially, for example, as the possibility of  having no more possibilities. 
it is not clear, however, what death so understood has to do with the succession of  gen-
erations, the replacement of  the dead by the living, or with any means historians use, 
when speaking of  groups, to deal with the fact that death is the death of  an individual 
person. even, therefore, when death is understood existentially, ricoeur’s mention of  
mortal time in the present context does not buttress the idea that generational succes-
sion institutes a third time.
The third instrument is traces. The expression “traces” refers to the materials his-
torians attend to in constructing their accounts of  the past: documents chiefly, but also 
other remnants such as tools, human remains, films, and ruins. These artifacts are ves-
tiges, left-overs from the past; they are material entities and arrangements thereof  that 
have come down to us. in attending to them, the historian treats them, via imagination 
and inference, as indicators of  a past hic and nunc: the activity of  human beings who 
have been. A trace is thus a sign-effect: both an effect of  past activity and something 
that points to actions, states of  affairs, and events, including the actions that caused it. 
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The trace thus combines relations of  significance and causality. 
According to ricoeur, a trace institutes a third time, the time of  history, in which 
lived time and succession “overlap” or “contaminate” (ibid., 123) one another. This 
overlap is evidently connected with the nature of  the trace as sign-effect. Qua sign, the 
trace points toward phenomena bound up with lived time, i.e., human actions and the 
events bearing on them, whereas qua effect it is linked to the realm of  before and after. 
As with calendars and generational succession, however, it is not obvious that anything 
pertaining to lived time characterizes the trace or the time it institutes. Nothing of  the 
temporality of  the stream of  experience—the retention of  the past or protention of  the 
future—is implicated in the notion of  a trace. The actions that the trace qua sign points 
to could merely be links in causal series of  actions, dimensionless events taking place 
before and after other events. The historical time that traces institute is supposed to 
combine features of  lived time and succession. it actually combines features of  life with 
succession; indeed, all three instruments inscribe life, not its temporality, on succession. 
so the time of  history is a kind of  succession. it is not some third thing.
Of  course, historians are interested in reconstructing both the temporality of  life 
and the time of  the universe. This becomes evident when the temporality of  life is 
interpreted as teleological action temporality (see section three): a historical narrative 
both tells of  actions and events that succeed one another and describes the teleological 
dimensions of  the human lives involved. Toward the end of  his discussion, ricoeur 
suggested that calendars, generational successions, and traces do not themselves com-
bine lived and cosmic time. rather, historians do this. it is their use of  calendars, gen-
erational successions, and traces in fashioning accounts that “constructs the juncture 
brought about by the overlapping of  the existential and empirical in the significance 
of  the trace.” (ibid., 125) ricoeur filled out this suggestion by showing how features of  
what heidegger called “world time” (something tied to existential dimensionality—see 
section four) structure the employment of  traces and thereby interject an element of  
existential time into their significance. in ricoeur’s (ibid., 92) presentation, however, the 
features of  world-time involved—datability, extension, and publicness—structure the 
employment of  traces only in these features’ nonexistential, objective (“leveled-off ”) 
form, as features of  time ordinarily conceived of  as a succession of  moments: actual 
dating, measurement of  intervals, and simultaneity. Once again, nothing of  lived cum 
existential temporality survives in the time instituted by traces.
still, ricoeur is right, i believe, that existential and objective time meet in history. 
What’s more, his suggestion that the activity of  historians, and not an entity or idea 
used or scrutinized by them, is the vehicle whereby existential time and succession are 
intercalated, valuably points toward the possibility that action is the site where times 
meet. This possibility is dimly reflected in ricoeur’s contention that the narratives that 
historical practice produces “refigure” time in the sense of  mixing phenomenological 
and cosmic times. Narratives do, indeed, mix times of  the two sorts. Vis-à-vis the topic 
of  this essay, however, this fact comes too late. Narratives tell of  successions of  actions 
and events and the existential dimensions of  the actions involved only because (1) suc-
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cessions that embrace human activity evince existential dimensionality and (2) the 
dimensionality of  human life is bound up with successions (e.g., those people respond 
to). That is, times of  the two sorts intermingle in the object domain called history—not 
just in narratives of  happenings in that domain, as ricoeur implied. more to the point, 
this intermingling characterizes each and every human action. For human activity is at 
once positioned before and after other events and inherently dimensional.
iii. ACTiViTy As The meeTiNg POiNT OF Times
The following analysis of  human activity is based on heidegger’s account of  being-
in-the-world in Being and Time. The reason i draw on heidegger at this juncture is that 
his account of  being-in-the-world offers a propitious account of  human activity and its 
temporality. Because i have elsewhere discussed how it does so (schatzki forthcoming), 
the current section simply refers to, and does not interpret, heidegger.
Acting has a dual ontological nature. it is an event, or occurrence, in objective 
time, where to take place in objective time is to occur before and after other events. it 
is also a performance, which means (1) that it is a doing and (2) that it is voluntary and 
intentional. A doing is an accomplishment, an event for which someone or something 
is responsible. A doing is intentional if  and only if  it occurs in order that something be 
the case (i.e., purposively) because something else is the case (i.e., for a reason), where to 
take place in order that something be the case in turn means to take place either aim-
ing at it or so that it is achieved (breaking a window and throwing a baseball to break a 
window illustrate, respectively, the two possibilities). Acting is inherently a teleological 
event.
Whenever someone acts, i.e., purposively does something for a reason, performing 
the action makes sense to her as the thing to do given …in order to … for the sake of  some 
way of  being. if, because the neighbor’s dog bit him the day before, someone throws a 
baseball at a neighbor’s window in order to break it, doing this makes sense to her for 
the sake of  something like gaining revenge. The way of  being for the sake of  which 
someone acts—her end—is something sought, something toward which she comes in act-
ing. This phenomenon clearly has something to do with the future. indeed, heidegger 
claimed (1982, 265) that it is the primary concept of  Zu-kunft, though i will not advocate 
this claim in the following. An important feature of  the end of  activity is that qua end 
it does not come after activity; it is not something that, at the time of  acting, does not 
yet exist, at which acting aims. rather, qua end it is something that is sought so long as 
the person acts; the end qua end must be so long as the performance continues (the end 
satisfies this condition by being a possible way of  being). since, consequently, acting for 
the sake of…has something to do with the future, this future, the existential future of  
acting, is a dimension of  current activity.
That, furthermore, the baseball thrower does something because the dog bit her 
reveals something about how things matter to her. how things matter to a person is a 
not chosen condition in which she finds herself, a way she in each case already is. That 
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things already matter to a person in this way or that has something to do with the past: 
what matters, that given which (because of  which) a person acts, is something the actor 
commences from, or as heidegger put it (1962, 390), “goes back to” in acting. Qua 
something that matters, i.e., qua motive, however, that because of  which someone acts 
cannot precede the action; it cannot be something that at the time of  acting no longer 
exists (indeed, what matters-motivates can be something that has not yet occurred). 
rather, that because of  which a person acts is that because of  which she acts so long 
as she acts. so the existential past of  acting, like its existential future, is a dimension of  
current activity. The past and future of  a performance are, respectively, something mat-
tering and pursuing a particular end, both of  which exist throughout the performance
As a teleological event, consequently, acting has two times: (1) the position (instant 
or interval) it occupies before and after other events and (2) its stretchedness between 
a future (end) and past (something mattering). Acting is an occurrence that at once 
occupies a place in the successions of  objective reality and exhibits an existential past 
and future. heidegger marked the significant difference between these two types of  
time by describing succession as “time” (Zeit) and marshalling the term “temporality” 
(Zeitlichkeit) for existential dimensionality. i will henceforth follow this usage. human 
acting is the site where the temporality of  the soul and the time of  the universe meet.4 
it so qualifies, however, not by virtue of  joining features of  each in some third time as 
in ricoeur, but instead by virtue of  possessing a dual nature as a denizen of  succession 
and what fills out existence.
Alfred schutz (1962, 215) noted a similar two-foldness:
We experience our bodily movements simultaneously on two different planes: 
inasmuch as they are movements in the outer world we look at them as events 
happening in space and spatial time…; inasmuch as they are experienced together 
from within as happening changes, as manifestations of  our spontaneity pertaining 
to our stream of  consciousness, they partake of  our inner time or durée.
The bodily movements of  which schutz wrote are, in my terminology, bodily actions. 
They are doings—bodily events for which the human being is responsible—that are 
actions either because they themselves are the actor’s ends or because she performs 
them in order to achieve her ends. The succession time of  bodily acting is the interval 
occupied by the movement in which it consists (when the person acts in order to achieve 
an end, the acting subtends further actions whose extents depend on the end involved 
and the causal processes spawned by the movement that lead to the end’s achievement). 
schutz, following Bergson, characterized succession time as “spatial time.” At the same 
time, since the bodily action is performed purposively and for a reason, it instantiates 
existential temporality. schutz, again following Bergson, substituted durée—the inner 
time constituted in the continuous advance of  conscious life—for existential time in 
his formulation: acting is “an event in spatial time” that “partake[s] of…durée.” Of  
4. The activities of  entities other than humans qualify as such a site to the extent that these entities, too, go 
back to… coming toward…in their activities. it is beyond the compass of  this essay to examine how true 
this is of  select nonhumans.
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course, heideggarian existential temporality considerably differs from Bergsonian durée. 
existence, according to heidegger, is a happening whereas conscious life, according 
to Bergson, is a flow. Durée, furthermore, is not inherently teleological and connotes 
“succession without separation” or “the uninterrupted solidarity of  before and after” 
(Bergson 1965, 45) elsewhere (schatzki under review) i have discussed at length this 
difference and my reasons for preferring heidegger over Bergson in theorizing the kind 
of  time of  action that complements succession.
iV. heiDeggAriAN exisTeNTiAL TemPOrALiTy As Time
The current section defends the cogency of  calling the time of  the soul, in particu-
lar, the existential temporality of  activity described in the previous section, a type of  
time. Although my argument, strictly speaking, applies to heideggarian temporality 
alone, i intend it to be a stand-in for a defense of  the propriety of  calling existential or 
experiential times in general (including husserlian retentional-protential structure and 
Bergsonian durée) types of  time. i offer this defense for two reasons. The first is that, as 
mentioned at the outset, a powerful intuition in present-day Western intellectual culture 
is that time is essentially tied to succession: anyone with this intuition will reject the idea 
that going back to certain states of  affairs coming toward certain ways of  being consti-
tutes a type of  time. The second reason is that my defense takes the form of  a descrip-
tion of  how existential time and succession meet in activity.
replies to the rejection of  existential temporality as a form of  time can, among 
other things, (1) appeal to Plotinus and Augustine as originators of  an alternative way of  
thinking, (2) claim, as heidegger did, that being toward an end is the primary sense of  
Zu-kunft, (3) follow heidegger in claiming that existential temporality is a form of  time 
because it explains succession time, or (4) highlight differences between past, present, 
and future, on the one hand, and before and after on the other. The conclusion of  this 
section briefly follows the fourth tact, which i consider decisive. most of  this section, 
however, elaborates my account of  activity time by drawing into it heidegger’s notion 
of  world time. This notion identifies key temporal features of  human activity that sug-
gest that existential temporality is legitimately labeled a kind of  time. my discussion of  
world time critically works off  a thought-provoking analysis of  it offered by a prominent 
interpreter of  heidegger, William Blattner.
Blattner (1999) argues (1) that heidegger maintained that the dimensionality of  
existence is a type of  time, (2) that heidegger held this because he, heidegger, thought 
that dimensionality can explain the ordinary concept of  time as a succession of  nows 
(henceforth, time so conceived will be called “ordinary time”), and (3) that because 
his attempt to show that dimensionality explains ordinary time fails, the dimensional-
ity of  existence does not qualify as a type of  time. The principal reason heidegger’s 
demonstration fails is that succession, an essential feature of  ordinary time, cannot be 
derived from dimensionality. Blattner is right that heidegger’s argument that dimen-
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that dimensionality and succession are distinct kinds of  time. This failure, however, does 
not preclude dimensionality from being a form of  time; it entails only that heidegger 
did not have a good argument for maintaining that it is (and also that dimensionality 
is not originary time as heidegger claimed [1982, 268]). incidentally, heidegger’s claim 
that dimensionality explains ordinary time is his version of  the idea that objective time 
derives from the time of  the soul. schelling and Bergson are two other prominent advo-
cates of  this idea. This idea represents a further position on the relation between succes-
sion and the time of  the soul, already mentioned others being the claims that the time 
of  the soul is not a form of  time at all, that the two categories of  time form a duality, 
and that they are versions of  a single master category. As noted at the outset, i simply 
assume in this essay that the two forms of  time form a duality.
As heidegger used the expression, “world time” denotes the time a person expresses 
and reckons with (explicitly or sotto voce) in continuous ongoing life, the time in which 
the entities and events she therewith deals with are encountered. in the following, i want 
to show that the temporal character of  world time depends just as much on existential 
dimensionality as it does on succession. This fact does not entail that dimensionality 
is a type of  time. if, however, the temporal being of  something depends on x and y, 
and x is a kind of  time, then prima facie it is at least plausible that y is a kind of  time, 
too. in other words, this double dependency provides some reason to think (1) that any 
insistence that succession is the only type of  time needs defense (i.e., cannot simply be 
assumed, as is usual) and (2) that it is plausible to think that the time of  action is dual. 
indeed, once heidegger’s attempt to derive ordinary time from existential temporality 
is abandoned, this double dependency provides impetus for thinking that time is dual: 
the failure of  heidegger’s monism need not promote an opposed monism. Blattner, 
incidentally, acknowledges (1999, 184) the possibility that world time could depend on 
both dimensionality and succession and comments that this is a “comfortable position” 
for a naturalist. i do not claim that the following “naturalist” position should be attrib-
uted to heidegger.
i offer two arguments for the claim that the temporal character of  world time 
depends as much on existential temporality as on succession. The first argument con-
cerns the proper interpretation of  world time and maintains that the nows of  world 
time and the nows of  ordinary time are not identical. The second argument makes a 
more general point about the two categories of  time, arguing that the past, present, 
and future of  world time cannot be analyzed into before and after and instead require 
existential dimensionality.
Both world time and ordinary time contain nows. The nows of  world time are the 
nows a person expresses and reckons with and in which the phenomena she deals with 
are encountered. World time nows can thus be formerly defined as the nows in terms of  
which action proceeds. The nows of  ordinary time, by contrast, are empty instants or 
intervals (durations), the latter ranging from the infinitesimal to the infinite, that lie in 
the continuum of  objective reality and form limitless successions. Blattner holds (1999, 
217-9) that any world time now is also a ordinary time now and that nows of  the two 
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types ultimately constitute one overall succession: world time nows do not form their 
own succession(s) distinct from the successions of  empty nows. While i agree with the 
second thesis, i deny the first. Contra Blattner, a world time now is not identical with 
an ordinary now. rather, as i explain below, to any world time now corresponds a ordi-
nary time now, and it is because of  this correspondence that any world time now can 
be assigned a position in the overall continuum of  empty nows. World time nows also 
belong to nonsuccession teleological sequences distinct from succession sequences of  
ordinary nows. All in all, my point is that features of  world time nows are as dependent 
on existential dimensionality as they are on succession.
Any world time now is someone’s now (possibly indefinitely many people’s now). 
more specifically, any now is the now of  a particular person’s stream of  activity (par-
ticular persons’ streams). heidegger noted that a world time now is datable: it is a now 
that such and such. more fully, it is a now that such and such, it is time to do so and so 
(see heidegger 1962, 467), where such and such is a state of  affairs pertinent to ongoing 
activity and the action whose time has come is what the person is doing. such and such 
stands for the situation of  action. A world time now is, thus, now performing this action 
in this situation (cf. Brockelman 1977). For instance, a person’s now might be now writ-
ing on a blackboard in the middle of  class. Because the bounds of  a person’s situation 
are usually elastic, so too is the identity of  his now. The person could be writing on the 
blackboard, not just in class, but also facing the need for pedagogical improvement.
Courses of  activity, moreover, are informed by earlier and later on: a person pro-
ceeds out of  an understanding of  both then, when such and such and formerly, when 
such and such (the such and suchs can be actions, events, or situations). These then, 
whens and formerly, whens articulate or bear on the teleology that governs acting: an 
actor always proceeds out of  an understanding of  then, whens and formerly, whens that 
attach to the ends, purposes, and motives of  current acting. if  the teacher’s purpose in 
writing on the blackboard is to convey a point, he acts understanding that then, when 
the point is conveyed, i’ll, say, call it quits for the day. if  the end of  writing on the board 
is, say, to be as good a teacher as possible, he also acts understanding that then, when 
i’ve been as good a teacher as i can, i can get back to research. similarly, if  he is writing 
on the board because no one understood what was said the previous class, he proceeds 
understanding formerly, when no one understood what i said. Note that because earlier 
and later on are horizons of  action, only what bears on, i.e., is relevant to what someone 
is doing and why can date a then or formerly.5
5. Then, whens and formerly, whens have another important characteristic: they are relative to the current 
now. Any then is a not yet now, and any formerly is a no longer now. (This characteristic does not transform 
world time nows, thens, and formerlies into ordinary time phenomena because they, unlike ordinary time 
nows, still possess content, i.e., are dated by reference to activity and situation.) On this point my interpre-
tation of  heidegger diverges strongly from Blattner’s. Blattner writes (1999, 174ff.) that then, whens and 
formerly, whens contain nows; that is, “not yet now” and “no longer now” denote nows that are not yet or 
no longer. i, by contrast, understand these phrases to denote statuses: being not yet or no longer relative 
to now. On my interpretation as opposed to Blattner’s (ibid., 162), it is not essential to the now that it be 
part of  a sequence of  nows. As Blattner notes, however, there are few textual passages to go on in this con-
	 COSMOS	AND	HISTORY	 204
heidegger’s world time is a feature of  activity. A world time now is a now doing 
this in this situation; the openness of  activity to earlier and later harbors world time 
thens and formerlies that articulate the teleological structure of  action (or are otherwise 
relevant to the course of  action, as when a then, when articulates an expectation); and 
these modalities are held together through a person’s being stretched between sought 
ways of  being and things mattering. To these nows, thens, and formerlies correspond 
ordinary time nows (empty instants and intervals). The latter are implicit in the former. 
The ordinary time now lying in the world time now is the instant or interval during 
which performing this-action-in-this-situation occurs. The ordinary nows lying in the 
then, when such and such and formerly, when such and such are likewise instants or 
intervals. The reason why ordinary nows correspond to these world time phenomena 
is that, because an action at once occurs before and after other events and is stretched 
from mattering toward ends, its current world time now coincides with an instant or 
interval in succession time.
World time nows, however, are not identical with ordinary time ones. To begin with, 
a world time now is relative to situation: now doing this in this situation. This phenom-
enon is indivisible. By contrast, when the ordinary now that corresponds to this world 
time now is an interval, it is divisible, indeed, indefinitely so. Nows of  both sorts, fur-
thermore, belong to sequences. Formerly, when such and such/acting in this situation/
then, when such and such form a sequence, to which corresponds a sequence of  ordi-
nary nows, t1, t2, t3. These sequences are distinct, though not separate. The ordinary now 
sequence is a succession of  content-less instants and intervals that fits into a wider field 
of  such successions. By contrast, the expressions “then, when such and such” and “for-
merly, when such and such” have teleological meaning. it is not just that teleology sup-
plies the contents, the such and suchs (ends and motives), for these expressions. “Then, 
when such and such” means either end/purpose of  acting achieved or what motivates 
acting obtains, whereas “formerly, when such and such” means what motivates acting 
obtains. These expressions are by definition temporal expressions. The temporal nature 
of  the sequence, as a result, is in part teleological: existential temporality is a teleological 
phenomenon. Of  course, formerly-now-then also ipso facto form a succession because 
a now that is not yet and a now that is no longer are contained in the then and former-
ly: now no longer-now-now not yet.6 Formerlies, nows, and thens, hence the temporal 
nature of  any sequence of  them, combine teleology and succession. 
A further difference between a world time sequence and a ordinary time one is that 
text. indeed, the texts are not consistent. in Basic Problems of  Phenomenology (e.g., 271) heidegger sometimes 
implied that world time is a sequence of  nows, whereas in Being and Time (473-4) he described time as a 
sequence of  nows as the ordinary interpretation of  world time. in both texts, however, heidegger wrote 
that the ordinary understanding of  time as a sequence of  nows is an understanding of  a vorhandene phe-
nomenon (1962, 475; 1982, 272). World time, by contrast, partakes of  Dasein’s kind of  being. hence, the 
issue between Blattner and myself  is whether there is a nonvorhandene type of  now sequence, to an instance 
of  which every world time now belongs.
6. When both the motive and the end or purpose are articulated in thens, the indefiniteness of  t3 makes it 
indeterminate whether a succession is involved.
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transitivity is a property of  the second but not of  the first. if  t1 precedes t2 and t2 pre-
cedes t3, t1 precedes t3. By contrast, it is not obvious how transitivity applies to a world 
time sequence. it does, of  course, apply to the succession contained in such a sequence. 
But it does not apply to the sequence as such. To begin with, the relation of  what-
motivates-acting obtains (past) to acting (present), and that of  acting (present) to end-
of-acting achieved (future), are of  different types: motivation and seeking. moreover, 
a transitivity relation that Blattner (e.g., 1999, 182) ascribes to the future—if  one acts 
for the sake of  one thing and pursues that thing for the sake of  another thing, one acts 
for the sake of  the second thing—does not hold of  the past. if  one acts because of  one 
thing and proceeds because of  that thing because of  another thing (this second because 
might not exist), it does not follow that one acts because of  the second thing. For exam-
ple, if  the teacher writes on the blackboard because the students did not follow the pre-
vious lecture, and he is motivated by this failure because (he believes) they need to learn, 
it does not follow that his reason for writing on the blackboard is that they need to learn. 
in short, the world time past and future are typically asymmetrical, whereas before and 
after are symmetrical. A final difference between the two sequences is, again, divisibil-
ity. Between the temporal positions in any succession exist further positions. This fact 
reflects the indefinite divisibility of  continuous time. in a world time sequence, however, 
there are only as many positions as there are components to the teleology governing the 
sequence. World time, consequently, is gappy (heidegger 1962, 462), that is, composed 
of  elements between which no further elements occur.
Blattner (1999, 217-8) seems to fear that affirming the distinction between the two 
types of  sequences entails the existence of  something like a multiplicity of  streams of  
time, a supposedly unintelligible idea. however, because any world time sequence con-
tains an ordinary time succession, and because all ordinary time successions fit together 
(relativistic considerations are not pertinent in this context), world time sequences are 
commensurable—both with one another and in the sense that all sequences form a 
single succession. still, the nows of  world time and the nows of  ordinary time are dif-
ferent both qua nows and in the types of  sequence to which they belong. The temporal 
character of  world time thus very much depends on dimensionality.
i will be briefer regarding the second argument for this dependence. This argument 
illustrates the above mentioned fourth type of  response to the dismissal of  existential 
dimensionality as a kind of  time. it stakes two claims: (1) that world time essentially 
exhibits past, present, and future, and (2) that existential dimensionality is necessary 
to there being this past, present, and future. mcTaggart’s discussion of  two systems of  
temporal ordering—before and after, and past, present, and future—spawned consider-
able discussion of  the relations and priorities between the systems. The claim that suc-
cession is the only real kind of  time entails that temporal ordering can be exhaustively 
analyzed via before and after.
World time is the time of  concernful absorption in the world. Twentieth-century 
philosophy and psychology have constantly reaffirmed the idea that an omnipresent 
feature of  mindful activity in practical contexts is its current, that is to say, present stage: 
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what someone is presently doing—this in this situation. it is inconceivable, moreover, 
that activity has a present stage without also possessing past and future ones; this truism 
is reflected in the fact that philosophy, psychology, and the human sciences generally 
have often analyzed human life into past, present, and future phases. Past, present, and 
future, however, cannot be reduced to before and after relations. For the singularity of  
the present resists analysis in terms of  such relations. in discussions of  such topics, those 
advocates of  temporal ordering as succession alone who treat time as a procession of  
moments (or positions) define the present moment as the one that is neither before nor 
after the moment “this here” sentence is written or read. (The analysis can be relativ-
ized to any arbitrary moment.) Transposed to the current discussion, the idea is that, 
assuming that world time, or rather, human life always has a now, the present world 
time now can be defined as the now that is neither earlier nor later than now writing or 
reading this here sentence. more directly, the present now can be defined as now writing 
or reading this here sentence. The problem with this definition is that there is no way 
to pick out the action (writing or reading; more generally x-ing) relative to which past 
and future are to be defined, independently of  the present world time now. One relies 
on the present now to identify this action, in this case, writing or reading. (A parallel 
predicament holds of  the thesis that all temporal orders are analyzable as before and 
after relations.) The present, in other words, is simply given and is not analyzable.
What holds of  the world time present holds of  its past and future. They cannot be 
analyzed into before and after. it should be obvious, moreover, that the above discussed 
earlier and later on horizons of  world time are essentially tied to existential dimension-
ality: if  existence was not departing from…coming toward…(thrown projecting), action 
would have not have these horizons. The fact that these temporal features of  world time 
depend on existential dimensionality once again makes it at least plausible that dimen-
sionality warrants consideration as something kin to time.
V. The Times OF hisTOry
The preceding discussion makes vivid how existential time and succession meet 
in human activity. As indicated, however, i agree with ricoeur that history is a much 
broader arena than action simpliciter where times meet. Before laying out my version 
of  this thesis, i want first to consider a notion of  historical time due to David Carr that 
resonates with ricoeur’s account of  human life and narration (see ricoeur 1991).
Drawing on husserl, Carr (1986) argues that human experience and action exhibit 
a narrative structure that centrally consists in a beginning-middle-end ordering. he 
offers a parallel analysis of  communities. For present purposes, he makes three key 
claims about communities: (1) that “a community exists wherever a narrative account 
exists of  a we which has continuous existence through its experiences and activities 
(Carr 1986, 163; cf. 149-50; such a narrative exists when individuals accept or subscribe 
to it, thereby becoming community members); (2) that we-narratives display the begin-
ning-middle-end order possessed by narratives that structure action; and (3) that the 
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configured sequences of  past events related by we-narratives constitute historical time. 
historical time is, thus, the narrative past of  a community, to or on the background of  
which the community connects or undergoes present events befalling it. Although Carr 
suggests that community-constituting narratives can be “pre-thematic” (not consciously 
entertained; most narratives that constitute actions are this), he mostly describes them 
as “told,” thereby indicating that they are formulated (e.g., by leaders or bards), though 
not as reflectively formulated as are historians’ narratives (ibid., 177).
Carr’s analysis of  communities suggests a relation between the time of  the soul 
and historical time that differs from the one discussed in section two. Whereas ricoeur 
claimed that historical time involves an inscription of  lived time on objective time, Carr 
suggests that the past-present-future structure of  a person’s activity (a form of  existential 
activity time) is interwoven with historical times, with the configurations of  past com-
munity actions (and experiences) that are related in the narratives that constitute the 
communities to which the person belongs. The existential temporalities of  a person’s 
actions can, among other things, devolve from the historical times of  her communities, 
take over elements from them, be formulated in their terms, fit into them, or otherwise 
respond to them (e.g., ibid., 112, 162).
There is at least one mistake and two limitations to this way of  linking existential 
and historical times. The mistake is that action is not intrinsically structured narra-
tively, whether inchoately as ricoeur (1991) suggested or unreflectively as Carr argues. 
elsewhere i have argued at length (schatzki, forthcoming) that teleological structure is 
not a narrative and that the teleological temporality of  activity is not narratival (among 
other things, to act for the sake of  state of  being is not to project a narrative whose end 
and middle stage are the achievement of  that state and current activity, respectively). 
existential activity time has nothing inherently to do with the beginning-middle-end 
order of  narratives. The first limitation is that, because societies encompass consid-
erably more than the we-communities Carr discusses (pace ibid., 117), his notion of  
historical time has restricted scope. What he dubs “historical time” is a property of  
historical entities of  just one sort. history writing, historically speaking, has indeed been 
closely connected to we-communities, e.g., we greeks, we Christians, we British. What’s 
more, Carr (ibid., 100) is right that only events of  social significance quality as “histori-
cal” in one sense of  the term. The time of  history, however, is something more general, 
the time of  a domain, not a property of  one type of  entity in that domain. Carr does 
highlight the contributions narratives make to courses of  events in that domain. he 
overlooks that the time of  history is the time of  that domain, however, because he is 
interested in history only as it is for humans (e.g., ibid., 133) and therefore construes his-
torical time (the second limitation) as something narrated and only as such a feature of  
the domain of  history. The time of  history is more complex than community narratives 
plus whatever contribution they make to existential temporality.
history itself  has been, and is still today, widely construed as the realm and course 
of  human action. This realm can be equated with des gestae, as Collingwood (1999) 
advocated, or described as encompassing human actions and their intended and unin-
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tended effects, as ricoeur (e.g., 1991) and others have urged. so understood, history is 
ipso facto the meeting point of  times, at least when existential time is construed as a 
feature of  human activity. elsewhere (2003) i have suggested that history be demarcated 
differently, as the realm and course of  practice-arrangement nexuses. For (1) an action is 
inherently part of  a practice (where by “practices” i mean open spatial-temporal action 
manifolds such as political practices, educational practices, sports practices, cooking 
practices, and so on); (2) actions are performed at and amid arrangements of  material 
entities (people, artifacts, organisms, and things of  nature); so that (3) history as the 
realm and course of  human action inherently takes place within bundles of  practices 
and material arrangements. history as pervasively construed is an abstraction (extrac-
tion) from the wider dynamic realm of  practice-arrangement bundles. Accordingly, 
whatever justifies singling out the realm and course of  human activity as the object of  a 
particular discipline (history) also justifies taking the wider reality of  which this object is 
inherently a part as the fuller object of  that discipline. my claim that history is the meet-
ing-point of  dimensional temporality and succession is thus the thesis that the realm 
and course of  practice-arrangement bundles is this site. This realm and course must, 
therefore, exhibit both dimensional temporality and succession.7
The key phenomenon in this regard is practices. A practice (see schatzki 2002) is an 
open manifold of  actions organized by phenomena of  three sorts: (1) understandings 
of  how to perform the actions that compose the practice, (2) rules, by which i mean 
explicit instructions, admonishments, and orders, regarding the practice’s actions, and 
(3) what i call a “teleoaffective structure” that embraces end-project-action combina-
tions that participants in the practice either acceptably or are enjoined to carry out. (it 
also embraces acceptable and enjoined affectivities, a fact that i will set aside in the fol-
lowing.) A practice, as an open set of  actions each positioned in succession time, encom-
passes an overall succession of  often overlapping actions. This succession constitutes the 
course of  the practice, at least of  its action component. The course of  a practice also 
embraces chains (causal sequences) of  action. A complete accounting of  the successions 
marking a practice would include such further topics as the rhythm, regularity, and 
repetition of  its constituent actions.
A practice is not just a set of  actions. it also embraces an organization, which 
endures over time. The endurance of  practice organization is not a sequence, but 
consists in understandings, rules, ends, projects, and actions remaining part of  the 
organizational array expressed by the advancing manifold of  actions that composes the 
unfolding practice. giddens (1979: chapter two), like many other theorists, treats the 
endurance of  organization (“structure” in his terms) as the subsiding of  organization 
outside time and space. it is better to conceptualize the endurance of  organization as a 
temporal phenomenon. For a practice’s organization changes, and it is not obvious how 
a neostructural account such as giddens’s handles changes in an extra-spatial-tempo-
ral entity. Of  course, many components of  a practice’s organization remain the same 
7. The conceptual framework behind the following account of  historical time has been elaborated in other 
works, references to which are scattered in the text.
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over time. The succession that characterizes practice organization is usually marked by 
piecemeal change amid sameness, thus by slow transformation.
A practice encompasses not just the befores and afters of  its constituent actions and 
organizational elements. it also harbors existential temporalities. each of  the actions 
that helps composes a practice goes back to such and such while coming toward some-
thing. The past and future dimensions of  different constituent actions, performed by 
the same or different participants, can overlap or be the same (e.g., people act for the 
same end or carry out the same projects for the same end). The existential times of  
different activity streams can also be interdependent, as when one person does some-
thing because another person pursues a given end. All these existential temporalities 
are shaped in the organization of  the practice involved: the shared and interdependent 
existential temporalities of  the practice’s constituent actions are normatively circum-
scribed and enjoined by the enduring rules and teleoaffective structure that house the 
practice’s accepted and enjoined existential temporalities.
The ontological status of  enjoined practice teleologies differs from that of  the exis-
tential temporalities of  particular actions and activity streams: an enjoined teleology is 
a feature of  a practice, not of  the individuals participating in the practice. Versions of  
this teleology are taken up by different participants. more broadly, the pool of  accept-
able and enjoined teleologies housed in a practice’s rules and teleoaffective structure is 
a property of  the practice, not of  its participants. A practice thus contains what might 
be called an “objective” existential temporality: its normative pool of  existential tempo-
ralities. This objective pool specifies the existential temporalities actually instantiated in 
the practice’s constituent actions to the extent that the practice’s rules and teleoaffective 
structure determine what participants actually do and why. Usually correlative with the 
organization’s success in this regard is the extent to which it specifies chains or succes-
sions of  actions. This joint shaping of  existential temporalities and successions yields 
whatever coordination and orchestration characterize the actions composing the prac-
tice. Practices vary greatly in their specification of  temporality and time within them 
(compare military, religious, and economic practices).
Actions are not just moments of  practices, but also performed amid arrangements 
of  material entities (see schatzki 2002, passim). Arrangements obviously subside in suc-
cession time: they come and go in this time, and which entities compose them changes 
over time. They do not, however, partake of  existential temporality; only actions and 
actors do that. An arrangement does reflect any existential temporality in whose name 
it is laid out, as when a classroom is laid out with an eye to the ends to be pursued there. 
how an arrangement, or its components, are swept up into human activities likewise 
devolves from the existential temporalities of  the activities involved. An arrangement 
can also help shape which existential temporalities are instantiated in a given practice, 
as when an instructor reacts to the appearance of  the provost’s son in the classroom by 
acting for the sake of  enhancing her reputation. in ways such as these, arrangements 
are closely enmeshed with existential temporalities even though they themselves do not 
possess such temporalities.
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As noted, human action proceeds not just within practices and amid arrangements 
but as part of  practice-arrangement bundles. Two examples of  such bundles are educa-
tional practices-classrooms and educational practices-private offices (the arrangements 
involved—classrooms and offices—might also be materially connected, for instance, 
by hallways and lines of  communication).  The foregoing discussion should make clear 
how practice-arrangement bundles, and thus history as the realm and course of  such 
bundles, qualify as the site where succession and existential temporality meet. Note 
that, because such bundles invariably embrace varied state of  human coexistence, they 
compose social phenomena, familiar examples of  which include governments, fami-
lies, workplaces, universities, racial prejudice, economies, communities, road traffic, and 
religions. Any practice-arrangement bundle (indeed, any social phenomenon) exhib-
its a configuration of  successions and existential temporalities (objective, shared, and 
interdependent) that arises from the temporalities and times instantiated in its con-
stituent practices as these practices unfold amid its constituent material arrangements.8 
Bundles differ in the differential emphasis place in them on the existential past, present, 
or future; whereas nations, for instance, often emphasize the past, start-up companies 
emphasize the future. Other temporal features of  a bundle or social phenomenon are 
successions and sequences of  action, thus rhythms, regularities, and repetitions, as well 
as changes in arrangements and in practice-arrangement couplings (i.e., which prac-
tices are carried out at which arrangements). A more detailed account of  the temporal-
ity and time of  practice-arrangement bundles would address still further matters (see 
schatzki 2002, chapter four) such as the emergence of  new practices (via imposition, 
condensation, and appropriation) and the dynamics of  such bundles, which includes 
such phenomena as contagion, hybridization, and bifurcation (cf. rheinberger 1997), 
coherence and conflict, fragmentation and insemination, lines of  flight (cf. Deleuze and 
guattari 1984), media of  communication, and politics.
To sum up: history is the realm and course of  practice-arrangement bundles. it is 
the site of  myriad individual, shared, interdependent, and objective practice and social 
formation existential temporalities that are harbored in the organizations of  practices 
and jointly shaped by the layouts of  arrangements, past successions of  actions, and the 
narrative formations as well as discursive regimes of  practices and formations. history 
also obviously contains myriad action successions residing in the overall passage of  
earthly affairs. The time of  history is the totality of  shapes and series assumed by the 
two times in history. history, indeed, is the realm and course of  the meeting of  times.
This essay has argued that human activity, and human history more broadly, is the 
meeting point of  existential time and succession. my discussion took off  from a similar 
thesis of  ricoeur’s regarding history and filled out how the two categories meet in activ-
ity and history by way of  a heideggarian account of  activity and a practice theoretical 
8. John hall (1980) has suggested differentiating social formations from one another on the basis of, among 
other things, the type of  husserlian lived time they encompass. The idea easily transfers to existential 
temporality.
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account of  history. The essay also supplied considerations in favor of  the thesis that the 
time of  the soul, at least when this is understood as the existential-teleological time of  
activity, is legitimately construed as a type of  time. Although the scope of  the claims i 
have defended are limited, strictly speaking, to the heideggarian and practice theoreti-
cal forms in which i formulated them, as well as to those conceptions of  objective time 
that make succession essential to it, they point toward the veracity of  the wider claims. 
Left unfinished are a more comprehensive account of  history as the meeting point of  
times, an account of  the relation between the times and spaces of  history, and the issue 
of  whether the time of  objective reality and the time of  the soul are two forms of  one 
thing.9
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